

DDA

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

85-4259

OLL 85-3708/1

The Honorable Jack Brooks
Chairman
Committee on Government Operations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is in response to your letter of 26 November 1985 concerning the CIA's use of polygraph examinations with respect to four individuals, all of whom purportedly were or had been engaged in intelligence, counterintelligence or espionage activities at the time they were examined.

I assume that the interest of your Committee is in determining the effectiveness of the polygraph and not in the intelligence and counterintelligence information derived therefrom in these specific cases. I, therefore, would be most willing to make available to your Committee information about the general use of the polygraph by this Agency, provided this can be done in closed sessions with necessary security protection for the information provided. Such a presentation will not include intelligence and counterintelligence data obtained during the course of our examinations of these named individuals.

With all due respect to you and your Committee, the specifics of your request raise serious concerns regarding how best to serve your needs, in light of my own responsibilities. The requested questions, notes and other documentation used in the examinations of the named individuals could reveal information which is classified or otherwise very sensitive. These materials include substantive intelligence information, as well as personal information about the subjects. Additionally, the polygraph techniques used in these investigations involve sensitive intelligence methods. I also firmly believe that the disclosure of the individual polygraph results of any employee

or past employee of this Agency would seriously damage the ability of the Central Intelligence Agency to conduct polygraph examinations in an environment conducive to frank and honest responses.

As you know, the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, provides an explicit statutory scheme for the provision of intelligence-related information to Congress. In this regard, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence serves as the focal point within the House for intelligence matters relating to the CIA. I believe that we have a sound relationship with that Committee that takes into account the oversight concerns of Congress and the security concerns of the Executive Branch.

If the oversight process on such sensitive matters is to function effectively, I cannot respond routinely to congressional requests for information outside the normal channels established by the National Security Act. I believe this is particularly the case where intelligence sources and methods are involved, as they are in this case. For these reasons, I hope you can appreciate my reluctance to release all the information you have requested--particularly where law enforcement interests are still at stake.

I hope we might be able to satisfy your Committee's interests in the manner I have suggested. Therefore, if the arrangement I have proposed is acceptable to your Committee, we will prepare for an initial meeting with your Committee at a mutually acceptable date. I will be happy to discuss this further if you desire.

A copy of this letter is being sent to the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

Sincerely,

/s/ William J. Casey

William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence

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OLL (13 Dec 85)

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